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Abstract. This paper is concerned with the formal modelling of sig-
nalling and point control in the domain of railway engineering. Rules
for handling interlocking to ensure railway safety and liveness are often
intricate and challenging to verify. We develop a CSP||B model taking a
“natural modelling” approach, where the models are as close as possible
to the domain model, providing traceability and ease of understanding
to the domain expert. This leads to a natural separation between the
global modelling of the tracks in B, and the CSP encapsulation of the
local views of the individual trains following the driving rules. The ap-
proach is illustrated through a small case study (Mini-Alvey), and the
model provides verification through formal proofs or informative counter
example traces if verification fails.
1 Introduction
Formal verification of railway control software has been identified as one of the
“Grand Challenges” of Computer Science [9]. But in respect of this challenge,
a question has been asked by the community: “Where do the axioms come
from?” [5]. Bluntly expressing a view common to the Formal Methods com-
munity, Paulson states, “I have seen many pieces of work spoilt by unrealistic
models, incorrect axioms or proofs of irrelevant properties” [15]. The modelling
of systems, as well as of proof obligations, needs to be faithful.
Faithfulness relates to a variety of concerns. Axioms must be traceable to the
informal domain description. The model must be formulated in a way that the
reader can maintain a clear overview. The model must provide the right level
of abstraction for the properties to be shown: details that cannot destroy the
property should be left out, it must be possible for the properties to hold or
to be wrong. The proof steps should have a meaningful interpretation within
the original domain (an invariant has a meaning in the real world). The formal
model should be accessible to the domain experts (under minimal guidance).
Finally, it should be easy to switch between the real world and the modelling
world.
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Our paper reports on a case study in cooperation with the company Invensys
Rail, where railway engineers and computer scientists together undertake the ex-
ercise of domain engineering (Section 2) and formal modelling (Section 3). Here,
we use CSP||B [16], which combines event-based with state-based modelling.
This leads to a “natural modelling” approach, where the models are as close as
possible to the domain model, providing traceability and ease of understanding
to the domain expert. The verification tool ProB allows us to analyze the ob-
tained model for safety and liveness and provides meaningful counter example
traces if appropriate (Section 4). We relate our approach to previous studies
(Section 5) carried out in either a purely event-based or in a purely state-based
setting.
2 Informal description of the railway domain
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Fig. 1. Information flow.
Physically, a railway consists of (at least) four
di↵erent components; see Figure 1. The Con-
troller selects routes for trains. The Interlocking
serves as a safety mechanism with regards to the
Controller and, in addition, controls and moni-
tors the Track equipment. The Track equipment
consists of elements such as signals, points, and
track circuits: signals can show green or red (the
yellow aspect of a signal is not modelled since we
are only interested in whether a train is autho-
rized to enter a section); points can be in normal
position (leading trains straight ahead) or in re-
verse position (leading trains to a di↵erent line)
and track circuits detect if there is a train on a
track. Finally, Trains have a driver who deter-
mines their behaviour.
The Controller can request that the Inter-
locking sets a specific route. If the requested
route is safe to set, the Interlocking will set the
points and signals accordingly and will give a positive response to the Controller;
should the requested route be unsafe, the response will be negative. In order to
determine if it is safe to set a route, the Interlocking considers point positions,
semaphores3 that can lock a point, and the track occupation. For simplicity, in
this study we make the following (unrealistic) Assumption 1: Track equipment
reacts instantly and is free of defects. With this assumption, the Interlocking has
only to consider the track occupation as an input from the Track equipment. The
train driver decides if the train moves forward or halts. Here, so-called Driving
Rules (formulated by the railway authorities) say that, e.g., the driver shall stop
at a red signal, and may proceed at a green signal. The driver can decide to
halt at a green signal, e.g., because there are cattle on the tracks (not unheard
3 A semaphore is a type of railway signal in this context.
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of in Wales). The current movement of the train is observed by the track cir-
cuits. Assumption 1 allows us to abstract from the Track equipment layer, which
therefore is depicted with a dashed box in Figure 1.
Railways are built according to a Track plan. Figure 2 depicts a prominent
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Fig. 2. Mini-Alvey.
example referred to in the literature as the Mini-Alvey track plan [19, 17]. This
plan shows various tracks (TAB, TAC, TAD, . . . ), signals (S8, S12, S14), and
points (p201, p202). Notice that points carry two names, e.g., p201 and TAB:
as a point, they are in normal or reverse position, whereas as a track circuit,
they detect if they are occupied by a train. Signal engineers define which routes
shall be possible in a track plan. A route is a (directed) path in a track plan
which leads from one signal to the next signal; e.g., referring to the tables in
Figure 2, the tracks TAZ, TAB, TAC together form route 8B from signal S8 to
signal S12. With regards to the interplay between tracks and routes, we make
here Assumption 2: The set of routes uses tracks in only one direction. Many
real world track plans have this property; an end station, however, violates it. In
Figure 2 we assume that trains can move only in a clockwise direction and thus
Assumption 2 holds. Control tables define when an interlocking is allowed to set
a route. They define point positions and which tracks need to be free. For route
8B, for instance, it is required that point 201 is in normal position and that all
of the tracks TAZ, TAB, and TAC are clear.
To avoid reductions in journey time and capacity, the points of a route are
“released” behind a train. To this end, signalling engineers implement release
tables in the interlocking. For instance, point p201 on route 8B can be released
after a train has completely passed the point (TAB is free) and is on track TAC
(TAC is occupied).
The interlocking performs an infinite control loop in three steps: read inputs,
process data, and provide outputs. The cycle time of a real world interlocking
is in the order of one second. As we can see from Figure 1, the inputs to an
interlocking are route requests and track occupation, and its outputs are route
responses as well as signal and point settings. We make the following realistic
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Assumption 3: There is at most one route request per cycle. In its processing
phase, an interlocking releases points according to Figure 3, deals with a potential
Input: Track occupation
Output: Release locks of points
foreach point p do
foreach set route R do
if all tracks are free/occupied as required by release table of p then
Remove R from locks(p);
end
end
Fig. 3. Release of points.
route request according to the algorithm in Figure 4 and sets all signals to red if
Input: Route request for route R
Output: Route response
if all tracks of R are clear then
if all points of R are normal/reverse as required by R or free to move then
move all points of R which are not in the right position;
for each point p of R: append R to lock(p);
set the signal of R to “green”;
send “R granted” as route response;
else
send “R refused” as route response;
end
else
send “R refused” as route response;
end
Fig. 4. Route requests.
a condition of their control table is not true. Note that there can be more than
one green signal, and a train might not move onto its set route from one cycle
to the next. In the Mini-Alvey, however, this is not the case: the routes 8A and
8B as well as the routes 12A and 14A exclude each other; with two trains on
di↵erent routes, there is as most one green signal possible.
With regards to an interlocking system, Safety means:
Collision-freedom There are no collisions.
No-moving-points Trains are not derailed by moving points under them.
No-incorrect-set-points Trains are not derailed by moving onto points that
are not set for them.
Correct-speed Trains are not derailed due to too high speed, e.g., in a curve.
Liveness on the other hand means:
Progress It is always the case that some route can be set or a train can move.
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3 Event-based and state-based modelling
The information flow shown in Figure 1 suggests that railways should be mod-
elled in an event-based way: the controller sends a request message to the in-
terlocking to which the interlocking responds; the interlocking sends signalling
information to the trains; and the trains inform the interlocking about their
movements. The interlocking serves as the system’s clock: messages can be ex-
change once per cycle.
The control and release tables as shown in Figure 2 as well as their processing
described in Figures 3 and 4, however, suggest that railways should be modelled
in an state-based way: if points are in a certain state and tracks are in the state
“clear,” then the signal controlling a route can be set to green; if some tracks are
“clear” and others are “occupied,” then the lock can be removed from a point.
The language CSP||B [16] caters to this hybrid nature of railways and allows
one to build a natural mode which is accessible to the domain experts.
3.1 A short introduction to CSP||B
CSP||B [16] provides a way of combining the process algebra CSP [8] with the
B-Method [1]. CSP describes processes in terms of the patterns of events that
they can perform, and provides several semantic models for reasoning about
them. The B-Method describes components as B machines which manage state
and provide operations for querying and changing the state.
CSP||B provides a way of putting B machines and CSP processes in parallel.
This is done by synchronising B operations of the form y  a(x ) with CSP
communication events of the form a!x?y , and allowing values x and y to pass
between them on channels. In particular, the CSP process enforces the order in
which operations of the B machine are allowed to occur. By considering B ma-
chines as CSP processes, CSPkB treats parallel combinations of CSP processes
with B machines in a semantically well-founded way. This approach allows state
information to be handled by the B machine, while event behaviour is captured
by the CSP process.
3.2 Modelling aims
Our modelling principles aim to achieve:
– a model that is traceable to the informal domain description. This will enable
us to review that essential properties of a railway system are not omitted;
– a model that can easily cater for more complex railway systems, e.g., for
more complex driving rules;
– a generic architecture for modelling the railway domain that can be instan-
tiated with particular track plans. This will enable us in future to verify
general results about railway models;
– events (and operations) in the model that clearly reflect the algorithms of an
interlocking cycle. This will ensure that it should be easy to switch between
the real world and the model world.
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RW CTRL =2
r2ROUTE
(request !r ! RW CTRL)
TRAIN CTRL(t , currp)
= nextSignal !t?s !
if (s == none or s == green)
then (move.t .currp?newp ! TRAIN CTRL(t ,newp)
2
stay .t .currp ! TRAIN CTRL(t , currp))
else stay .t .currp ! TRAIN CTRL(t , currp)
ALL TRAINS
=2
t12TRACK
enter .albert .t1!
(2
t22di↵ (TRACK ,exclude(t1))
enter .bertie.t2!
(TRAIN CTRL(albert , t1) ||| TRAIN CTRL(bertie, t2)))
CTRL = (enter?t?p ! enter?t?p ! RW CTRL) k... ... ALL TRAINS
Fig. 6. CSP control processes for Controller and Trains.
3.3 A CSP||B model
Fig. 5. CSP||B Architecture
The architecture of our model4 is depicted
in Figure 5. CSP is used to describe the
driving rules of trains in order to control
their movement and enable the Controller
to issue route requests. The B part mod-
els the impact of the current movement of
trains on the track equipment and focuses
on interlocking.
Figure 6 illustrates the CSP that
uses the RW CTRL process to enable
route requests to be made, whereas the
TRAIN CTRL process deals with the
permissible movement of a train depend-
ing on the aspect of the signal that is pro-
tecting the track in front of it. It captures
the driving rule that a train (and hence a
driver) shall stop at a red signal. If there
is no signal protecting the track in front, then the train is free to move to the
next appropriate track position. As we shall see later, this position will depend
on the B model. The process ALL TRAINS enables us to initially place trains
on any track in a way that preserves safety. This representation is entirely ap-
propriate for a closed system of tracks. In this paper we focus on simply placing
two trains, namely albert and bertie, after which we can model the servicing of
route requests and explore their behaviour.
4 CSP||B Mini-Alvey model download: http://www.csp-b.org/fm2012-mini-alvey.zip
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In the B model the generic architecture of a track plan is represented in
three static machines: ControlTable, ClosedTopology and ReleaseTable, which
are instantiated for the Mini-Alvey. The associated datatypes for the elements
within a track plan are defined in a fourth static machine, ClosedContext, e.g.,
tracks have set definitions as shown in Figure 7. We specifically include the
TRACKSTATUS = {occ, empty} ^
ALLTRACK = {TAZ ,TAB ,TAC ,TAD ,TAE ,TBA,nullTrack} ^
TRACK = ALLTRACK   {nullTrack} ^
ASPECT = {red , green,none} ^
SIGNALSTATUS = ASPECT   {none}
Fig. 7. Datatype definitions for tracks defined in ClosedContext.
nullTrack in order to be able to identify the derailment of a train.
The ControlTable machine splits up modelling the control table into two
relations and a function, as shown in Figure 8; these are also instantiated for
normalTable 2 ROUTE $ POINTS ^
reverseTable 2 ROUTE $ POINTS ^
clearTable 2 ROUTE ! P(TRACK ) ^
lockTable 2 ROUTE $ POINTS ^
. . . ^
clearTable = {B8 7! {TAZ ,TAB ,TAC},A8 7! {TAZ ,TAB ,TBA},
A12 7! {TAD ,TAE},A14 7! {TAD ,TAE}}
Fig. 8. Control table information defined in ControlTable.
a particular track plan, e.g., see the instantiation of clearTable5. Additionally,
we relate which points would need to be locked for a particular route. The way
we have modelled this allows us to distinguish between points being locked by
more than one route, which will be useful when modelling railway systems that
contain double junctions.
The ReleaseTable machine models a relation, shown in Figure 9, which rep-
releaseTable 2 TRACK $ (ROUTE ⇤ POINTS) ^
releaseTable = {TBA 7! (A8, p201),TAC 7! (B8, p201),
TAE 7! (A12, p202),TAE 7! (A14, p202)}
Fig. 9. Definitions from ReleaseTable.
resents the release tables, stating which locks can be released when a particular
track is occupied.
The ClosedTopology machine models which signals are associated with a
route, the track where a signal is situated, the track where points are situated
and relations between tracks and possible successor tracks. For example, Fig-
ure 10 illustrates the relation homeSignal and instantiates it for the Mini-Alvey
5 In ProB [12] 8A is represented as A8 since ProB does not allow names to begin
with a numeral.
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signal 2 ROUTE ! SIGNAL ^
signal = {(A8 7! S8), (B8 7! S8), (A12 7! S12), (A14 7! S14)} ^
homeSignal 2 SIGNAL⇢ TRACK ^
homeSignal = {(S12 7! TAC ), (S14 7! TBA), (S8 7! TAE)}
next 2 TRACK $ TRACK ^
next = {(TAZ 7! TAB), (TAB 7! TAC ), (TAB 7! TBA), (TAC 7! TAD),
(TBA 7! TAD), (TAD 7! TAE), (TAE 7! TAZ )}
Fig. 10. Definitions from ClosedTopology.
example stating the signal S8 is associated with route 8B and that it is situated
on track TAE. The topology also provides all possible pairs of tracks and their
successor tracks, thus capturing Assumption 2. In the model we provide further
distinction by identifying those successor tracks that are static and the dynamic
successor tracks that are dependent on the point positions (we omit the details
here for brevity).
The Interlocking machine is the dynamic machine that captures information
about track occupation using sets, and the pos function models the location of
trains on tracks. This is an important function, as its specification as a partial
injective function TRAIN 7⇢ TRACK captures the safety requirements: a colli-
sion (two trains on the same track) violates the injective nature of this function.
Furthermore, a derailment violates the requirement that the range of pos is con-
tained in TRACK, since a derailment results in a train being on the nullTrack,
and nullTrack /2 TRACK .
The machine also captures information about signal settings using the func-
tion signalStatus and point settings using the sets: normalPoints and reverse-
Points. Additionally, the current locks on points are modelled using currentLocks
and is a subset of all those that were identified as possible locks in ControlTopol-
ogy. The machine also captures the current information about successor tracks
through the function nextd which is dependent upon the position of the points
and is a subset of next from ControlTopology. Figure 11 illustrates the invariant
emptyTracks ✓ TRACK ^
occupiedTracks ✓ TRACK ^
emptyTracks \ occupiedTracks = ; ^
pos : TRAIN 7⇢ TRACK ^
signalStatus 2 SIGNAL! SIGNALSTATUS ^
normalPoints ✓ POINTS ^
reversePoints ✓ POINTS ^
normalPoints \ reversePoints = ; ^
normalPoints [ reversePoints = POINTS ^
currentLocks 2 ROUTE $ POINTS ^
currentLocks ✓ lockTable ^
nextd 2 TRACK 7⇢ TRACK ^
nextd ✓ next
Fig. 11. Invariant from Interlocking.
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associated with this state. The initial state of the model sets all tracks to being
empty, all signals to red, all points to the normal position and no locks are made
on points.
This dynamic state and the constant information from all the other machines
are then updated and queried, respectively, in the operations of the Interlocking.
In this model the operations are precisely the events that were identified in the
CSP control process CTRL. In CSP||B in general, this 1-1 relationship between
operations and events need not exist. The algorithm for releasing points is re-
flected in the move operation. We focus on the request and nextSignal operations
in Figures 12 and 13, respectively.
bb    request(route) =
PRE route 2 ROUTE
THEN
/* are the tracks for a route empty */
IF ((clearTable(route) ✓ emptyTracks))
THEN
LET unlockedPoints BE
unlockedPoints = POINTS   ran(currentLocks)
IN
/* are all points in right position or unlocked */
IF ((normalTable[route] ✓ normalPoints [ unlockedPoints)^
(reverseTable[route] ✓ reversePoints [ unlockedPoints))
THEN
LET np, rp BE
np = (normalPointsnormalTable[route])  reverseTable[route]^
rp = (reversePointsreverseTable[route])  normalTable[route]
IN
/* move points on the route that need to be moved */
normalPoints := np ||
reversePoints := rp ||
/* for each point p of route, lock p */
currentLocks := currentLocks [ (route   lockTable) ||
/* set signal of route to green */
signalStatus(signal(route)) := green ||
/* grant the request */
bb := true ||
/* update topology, next track position might have changed because point changed*/
nextd := staticNext [ dynamicNext[(np ⇤ {normal} [ rp ⇤ {reverse})]
END
ELSE
bb := false /* refuse request */
END
END
ELSE
bb := false /* refuse request */
END
END
Fig. 12. request operation from Interlocking.
A route request r is made by the RW CTRL and this becomes the input route
to the corresponding B operation. The operation is responsible for providing the
appropriate boolean route response, bb, adopting the algorithm in Figure 4. For
example, in a scenario where a request for route 8B was being made in the
state {TAZ ,TAB ,TAC} 2 emptyTracks , the conditional would be true and the
operation would proceed with the algorithm and signal S8 would be set to green.
In addition to the route request algorithm itself, the B operation must also keep
the current topology of the network up-to-date by updating the nextd state.
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s    nextSignal(t) =
PRE t 2 TRAIN ^ t 2 dom(pos)
THEN
IF pos(t) /2 ran(homeSignal)
THEN
s := none
ELSE
s := signalStatus(homeSignal 1(pos(t)))
END
END
Fig. 13. nextSignal operation from Interlocking
The nextSignal operation enables the signal aspect controlling the next move
of a train, t , which is on a track, to be output as the parameter s, which is
provided as an input to the TRAIN CTRL process. For example, suppose bertie
was on track TAE then evaluating signalStatus(homeSignal 1(TAE )) returns its
current value which will be either red or green.
4 Verification of CSP||B model
Our CSP||B models can be verified using ProB [12] as it supports B models
that are controlled by CSP controllers. In this section we illustrate the use of
ProB to verify invariants in order to ensure safety (collision-freedom and no
derailment). Invariant violations will enable us to identify errors in control tables
and provide meaningful traces to demonstrate this violation. Additionally, we
outline how model checking can be used in order to verify liveness. This approach
to verification enables us to identify errors in release tables.
4.1 Safety Verification
In the Interlocking machine we captured the notion of safety using the pos func-
tion in an invariant. The following four scenarios illustrate how we may check
the model with respect to this invariant.
B model only: Using ProB we performed an invariant check, which means that
all states of the Interlocking machine are explored. ProB provided the following
counter-example trace which leads to violation of the invariant (collision):
henter .albert .TAZ , enter .bertie.TAB ,move.albert .TAZ .TABi
The B model alone does not place any constraints on train moves and therefore
it is no surprise that a collision occurs. In this case, albert moved through a red
light to collide with bertie on TAZ .
CSP||B model: The same invariant check was performed on the Interlocking
as controlled by the CTRL resulting in all nodes being checked; no invariant
violations were found. In this case the train driving rules ensure that collisions
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do not occur.
CSP||B model with faulty clear tracks for a route in control table:
Suppose the control table is adjusted to contain the following mistake (i.e. TAB
is omitted from the tracks that should be clear to grant route 8B):
clearTable = {B8 7! {TAZ ,TAC},A8 7! {TAZ ,TAB ,TBA},
A12 7! {TAD ,TAE},A14 7! {TAD ,TAE}}
Then the following trace is produced automatically as a counter-example:
henter .albert .TAB , enter .bertie.TAE , request .B8.true,
nextSignal .bertie.green,move.bertie.TAE .TAZ ,
nextSignal .bertie.none,move.bertie.TAZ .TABi
This leads to a collision of the two trains on TAB. Since clearTable(B8) does
not take TAB into account, the fact that albert is already on TAB is ignored.
Consequently, as both TAZ and TAC are not occupied, the route is granted,
then signal S8 is set to green and this enables bertie to make the moves which
lead to the collision.
CSP||B model with faulty points in control table: If the control table
contains a mistake on the directions of points, then this may also impact on
safety. For example, suppose p202 is the wrong way around in the control table:
normalTable = {B8 7! p201,A14 7! p202} ^
reverseTable = {A8 7! p201,A12 7! p202}
Then the check yields the following counter-example trace showing the derail-
ment of bertie:
henter .albert .TAB , enter .bertie.TBA, request .A14.true,
nextSignal .bertie.green,move.bertie.TBA.nullTracki
This demonstrates a violation of the safety requirement no-incorrect-set-points.
4.2 Towards Liveness Verification
In addition to checking safety, ProB supports the analysis of models with respect
to liveness properties expressed either as LTL formulae or as deadlock-freedom
checks: that some progress can be made from any reachable state.
In our model, deadlock-freedom is not su cient to ensure real progress, since
the models have some transitions that correspond to no progress: rejected route
requests request .r .false or red signals and stationary trains nextSignal .t .red and
stay .t .p. ProB will report that the model is deadlock-free even when only those
events are possible.
To check for the progress property, we must consider the model without those
events. To do this, we first block the occurrence of the non-progressing events in
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the model, and then check for deadlock-freedom. This restriction on the model
is captured as a parallel combination on the controller which is expressed as
follows:
CTRL k... {|request.r .false,stay,nextSignal.t.red|} STOP
We check two scenarios with respect to deadlock-freedom under this controller:
CSP||B restricted model: ProB checks all states and confirms that the model
is deadlock-free. This means that at any stage either a route can be allocated,
or a train can progress, which gives the progress property.
CSP||B restricted model with faulty release table: If the release table
contains the mistake that TBA 7! (A8, p201) is omitted, so the lock (A8, p201)
will not be released, then we might expect some additional blocking behaviour.
The erroneous released table is as follows:
releaseTable = {TAC 7! (B8, p201),TAE 7! (A12, p202),
TAE 7! (A14, p202)}
In this case ProB automatically finds the trace that leads to a deadlock:
henter .albert .TAC , enter .bertie.TAE , request .A8.true,
nextSignal .bertie.green, move.bertie.TAE .TAZ , request .A12.true,
nextSignal .bertie.none, move.bertie.TAZ .TAB , nextSignal .Albert .green,
nextSignal .bertie.none, move.bertie.TAB .TBA, move.albert .TAC .TAD ,
nextSignal .albert .none, move.albert .TAD .TAE i
This leads to a situation where albert is on TAE , bertie is on TBA, but no route
is available, and both trains are at red lights. In particular, route B8 is not
available (even though the tracks are clear) as p201 is locked with (A8, p201).
4.3 Evaluation
We evaluate our model with respect to the aims listed in Section 3.2. With re-
spect to traceability, the responsibility of the CSP and B is clear: the CSP is
responsible for the controller and for the train driving rules, and the B is re-
sponsible for the interlocking. The particular track plan is explicit in the four B
static machines. The two safety properties checked in this paper are directly rep-
resented within B invariants in the model. Verification of the liveness property
is achieved as a deadlock-freedom check. It is clear where these checks are per-
formed, providing traceability. The structure of the model is su ciently generic
to allow more complexity in the railway system. More complex driving rules can
be captured within the CSP. More complex interlocking rules and track plans
can be captured simply by changing the static B machines. The model can also
be generalised to handle open track plans (with entry and exit tracks), and
crossings. Finally, we see that the events and the operations of the model clearly
reflect the information flow of Figure 1 and the interlocking cycle.
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5 Related Work
Our work builds upon prior approaches to the modelling and verification of rail-
ways. [3, 13] are prominent examples from the B community, [17, 14] are classical
contributions from process algebra, [7, 11] use techniques from Algebraic Spec-
ification. On a lower abstraction layer [6, 10] verify the safety of interlocking
programs with logical approaches. Our modelling is most related to Winter’s
approach in CSP [18] and Abrial’s modelling in Event-B [2]. In the following
we briefly discuss their respective approaches and the manner in which we con-
sider our approach to succeed in combining the successful aspects of these whilst
avoiding their perceived deficiencies.
5.1 Event-based modelling in CSP
In cooperation with Queensland Rail, Australia, as industrial partner, Win-
ter [18] presents a generic, event-based railway model in CSP as well as generic
formulations of the two safety properties Collision Freedom and NoMoving-
Points. Parts of the modelling are demonstrated by taking the track plan of the
Mini-Alvey from Figure 2 as an example. If a safety property is violated, the
model-checker FDR [4] provides counter-example traces in a format accessible
to railway engineers.
Winter distinguishes between the static and dynamic parts of the system. The
static part consists of data describing all model-specific elements, namely of a
representation of the track plan and of several relations derived from the control
tables. The dynamic part consists of CSP processes which encode the general
behaviour of trains, points, signals, routes etc. This behaviour is encoded in
events which – to a certain extent – appear in the information flow depicted
in Figure 1. Control is decentralized. Consequently, testing if conditions hold
are encoded via synchronizations: checking if a route can be set is encoded as a
synchronization of trains; the driving rule stipulating that a train stops at a red
signal is encoded as a synchronization between a train and a signal; etc.
Overall, this leads to a generic architecture and a natural representation of
two safety properties. Thanks to the event-based approach it is possible to pro-
vide informative counter-example traces. Traceability, however, is limited. There
are relations in the model derived from the control table. Thus, for example, the
driving rule “trains stop at a red signal” is distributed over di↵erent parts of
the model: it is a consequence of (1) the fact that the event “move to the first
track protected by a signal” belongs to a specific synchronziation set and (2) a
red signal does not o↵er this event.The model has no interlocking cycle.
In a follow-up publication [19], railways are modelled with Abstract State
Machines (ASM) and the CSP modelling from [18] is dismissed. It is stated
that the formal ASM model “is easier to read and understand” than the corre-
sponding CSP model [19]. The counter-examples presented in [19], however, lack
the elegance of the previous approach.
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5.2 State based modelling in Event-B
Chapter 17 of the book by Abrial [2] gives an excellent detailed description and
analysis of the railway domain, deriving a total of 39 di↵erent requirements.
One basic example of this is SAF-1: “A block be can be reserved for at most
one route” (page 519). The presentation – though tailored towards the Event-
B method – is in line with our Industrial partner’s view. There are, however,
di↵erences when it comes to details of how interlockings are implemented.
The book presents a tower of four refinements of an initial Event-B speci-
fication; further refinements needed in order to finalize the model are left out.
This tower builds up the railway domain in a step-by-step fashion; e.g., the sec-
ond refinement introduces readiness for a route, the third speaks about green
signals, the fourth introduces points. On each refinement level, various invari-
ants are proven to hold. For example, it is shown that the initial model has the
invariant inv0 3: rsrtbl 2 resbl ! resrt, that is, that the controller variable
rsrtbl representing a reserved route of reserved blocks is a mapping from the set
of reserved blocks resbl to the set of reserved routes resrt. It is then argued that
the fact that this mapping is total implies the safety property SAF-1 above.
The modelling approach is generic, even though no concrete model is proven
to be correct. Traceability in a tower of specifications can be complex for various
reasons. For instance, a requirement can be the consequence of invariants from
di↵erent levels. The relation between intended properties such as SAF-1 and the
model remains an informal one. This is in contrast to other approaches (including
Winter’s and ours) which directly represent the intended property in the formal
world and then prove that the modelled property is a mathematical consequence
of the formal model. Furthermore, the approach is monolithic: behaviour is not
attached to the di↵erent entities to which they relate. For example, the driving
rule “Trains are supposed to stop at red signals” (ENV-13) is modelled together
with the rule “A green signal turns back to red automatically as soon as the first
block is made occupied” (ENV-15). It is not evident that a control cycle can be
identified in this approach. In particular, it appears that train movements and
changes of signals are synchronized (see event FRONT MOVE 1, page 546).
This is not the case with interlockings: (1) several trains can move during one
cycle; (2) a particularly fast train might actually pass the first track protected
by a signal before the interlocking is able to react.
6 Conclusions
Through our association with Invensys Rail, we are working towards deriving
railway models which are formal and analysable by current verification technolo-
gies, yet are fully faithful; we do not want to hide the engineering understandings
held by our industrial partners in clever abstract encodings. Despite being ex-
pressed in the mathematical language of formal methods, our models must be
immediately understandable – and verifiable – by our industrial partners.
This has proven to be a challenge, as we find that the extant approaches to
railway modelling have been hindered in this respect by the framework in which
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they have been carried out. As explained above, modelling in the railway do-
main involves event-based components as well as state-based components. Using
a solely-event-based framework or a solely-state-based framework succeeds in
faithfully representing the relevant components, yet su↵ers in representing other
components through encodings which – whilst clever feats of abstract modelling
– are not easily appreciated by the working railway engineer.
In our future work we will develop and verify models based on open track
plans and more complex interlocking rules. We will also consider refining the
interlocking cycle so that train movement and the releasing of points can be
modelled separately; this will involve interface refinement and require an exten-
sion to our existing CSP||B theory.
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